Most writing about the Cyber Resilience Act is aimed at lawyers, and leaves the firmware lead with a list of nouns. This is the version we would give an engineering team: what the regulation makes you build, in what order, who in a small company owns each item, and what it costs.
It goes deeper than our 2026 certification map, which sets the CRA alongside CE, FCC and the rest of market access. Everything below is checked against the text of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 and its implementing acts, with article numbers so your regulatory person can check our reading.
Who the CRA catches, including you if you are American
The scope test in Article 2 is broad on purpose. The CRA covers products with digital elements made available on the EU market whose intended or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect data connection to a device or network. A BLE sensor that only ever talks to a phone is in. So is the companion app and the cloud backend, if the backend is a “remote data processing solution”: software you designed, without which the product cannot perform one of its functions.
The exclusions are narrow and sectoral. Medical and in vitro diagnostic devices under the MDR and IVDR are out, as are type-approved vehicles, certified aviation products and marine equipment. A fitness tracker that is not a medical device is very much in, and as we will see, in a stricter class than you might expect.
Where you are incorporated is irrelevant. The CRA attaches to the product on the EU market, so a Delaware company shipping into Europe is the “manufacturer” with all of Article 13’s obligations. Its EU importer carries a parallel duty under Article 19: it may not place the product on the market until it has checked that the conformity assessment was carried out, the technical documentation exists, and the product bears the CE marking with the user information in a language buyers understand. In practice, a serious EU distributor will ask a US brand for evidence before it signs. A Linux Foundation survey of 843 respondents published in June 2026 found 72 per cent of US and Canadian respondents were not familiar or only slightly familiar with the CRA, so a lot of those conversations are going to be awkward.
Find your class first, because it sets the route
The single most consequential engineering question is which class your product sits in, because that decides whether you can self-assess. Article 7 and Annex III define important products in two classes. Article 8 and Annex IV define critical products. Everything else is default. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392, adopted on 28 November 2025, gives the technical descriptions, and it confirms that the product’s core functionality decides the class.
| Class | Examples relevant to connected hardware | Conformity route (Article 32) | Notified body? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Default | Most sensors, thermostats, appliances, trackers, smart plugs | Module A internal control | No |
| Important class I | Smart locks, security cameras, baby monitors, alarm systems; internet-connected toys with social or location features; wearables that monitor health or are for under-14s; routers and modems; operating systems; MCUs and MPUs with security functions | Module A only if a harmonised standard, common specification or EU scheme is applied in full; otherwise module B+C or H | Usually, until standards are cited |
| Important class II | Firewalls and intrusion detection; hypervisors and container runtimes; tamper-resistant microcontrollers and microprocessors | Module B+C, H, or an EU scheme at “substantial” | Yes |
| Critical | Hardware devices with security boxes, smart meter gateways, smartcards and secure elements | European cybersecurity certificate where a delegated act requires one; otherwise as class II | Yes |
Two details in the text change real decisions. First, Article 7(1) says integrating an important component does not make your product important. Put a microcontroller with secure boot and a crypto engine into a thermostat, and the microcontroller vendor has a class I problem while your thermostat stays default. Second, the implementing regulation defines the wearable category as anything worn on the body that regularly or continuously senses and processes information relevant to the user’s health, naming fitness trackers, smartwatches, smart jewellery and smart clothing. Founders building “wellness” wearables to stay out of the MDR have walked straight into CRA class I.
The class I route is where timing hurts. Self-assessment requires a harmonised standard applied in full, and the standards are late. The Commission’s standardisation request had horizontal and vulnerability-handling standards due on 30 August 2026 and product-specific ones on 30 October 2026; a draft amendment published in July 2026 moves those to 31 October and 31 December 2026. The first horizontal parts, EN 40000-1-1 and EN 40000-1-2, were scheduled for CEN-CENELEC ratification on 2 November 2026, with citation in the Official Journal still to follow, and some technical-measure standards are not due until 30 October 2027. If you ship a class I product near December 2027, plan on a notified body and treat a cited standard arriving in time as an upside. The CRA’s notified-body provisions have applied since 11 June 2026, so bodies can now be designated.
What already applies: reporting, since 11 September 2026
Article 71 split the timetable. The bulk of the regulation applies from 11 December 2027, but Article 14 has applied since 11 September 2026, and Article 69(3) extends it to every in-scope product placed on the market before December 2027. Your installed base is covered today. This is the obligation teams most often misfile as a 2027 problem.
Article 14 covers two events: an actively exploited vulnerability in your product, meaning reliable evidence that a malicious actor has exploited it, and a severe incident affecting its security, meaning one that undermines the confidentiality, integrity, availability or authenticity of important data or functions, or lets malicious code run on the product or the user’s network. For each, the clock runs from the moment you become aware:
- an early warning within 24 hours, naming the member states where the product is sold;
- a notification within 72 hours, with the nature of the exploit or incident, what you have done, and what users can do;
- a final report no later than 14 days after a fix or mitigation is available for a vulnerability, or within one month of the notification for an incident.
You must also tell affected users, where appropriate in a machine-readable format. If you do not, the CSIRT may do it for you.
Reports go through ENISA’s Single Reporting Platform, which went live on 11 September 2026. The practical setup takes an afternoon and should be done before you need it. Each manufacturer has one Primary Assigned Representative and up to 20 Secondaries, each with an EU Login account with multi-factor authentication. Notifications go to the CSIRT of your main EU establishment. A manufacturer with no EU establishment picks the CSIRT by a fixed order: the member state of its authorised representative, then of its importer, then of its distributor, then where most of its users are. ENISA’s FAQ warns that a notification sent to the wrong CSIRT can be invalidated and has to be resubmitted, so work out which one is yours now, not during an incident.
Penalties under Article 64 reach €15 million or 2.5 per cent of worldwide turnover for breaches of Annex I and Articles 13 and 14. There is one concession worth knowing: Article 64(10) exempts micro and small enterprises from fines for missing the 24-hour early warning deadline. It does not cover the 72-hour notification, or the duty to report at all.
In engineering terms: a monitored security inbox, a written triage procedure that decides within hours whether something counts as “actively exploited”, and two named people who can file a report on a Sunday. Without device telemetry you will struggle to know you have an incident at all.
What applies from 11 December 2027: the build list
Annex I has two parts. Part I is about the product’s properties, Part II about your processes. Translated into work items:
Secure by default, with a reset. Ship in the secure configuration and let users restore it. The CRA text never says “default password”, but secure-by-default and the access-control requirement in Annex I Part I are where it lives. The standards the market already uses, ETSI EN 303 645 provision 5.1 and EN 18031 under the RED, read it as unique per-device credentials or mandatory setup, and the UK has banned guessable defaults since 29 April 2024. Build onboarding that forces a credential; do not let anyone skip it.
No known exploitable vulnerabilities at release. That requires knowing what is in the image, which is why the SBOM sits upstream of almost everything else.
Security updates, automatic by default. Part I requires that vulnerabilities can be fixed through updates, where applicable installed automatically by default, with a clear opt-out and an option to postpone. Part II adds secure distribution and, where technically feasible, security fixes shipped separately from feature releases. For hardware that means signed images, verified boot, rollback protection, an A/B or recovery path that survives power loss mid-update, and a release pipeline that can push a security-only build without dragging in half-finished features.
Access control, confidentiality, integrity. Authenticate every interface, encrypt data at rest and in transit with current mechanisms, and protect configuration and code against unauthorised modification. Debug ports left open on production boards are an attack surface finding, so lock JTAG and SWD.
Logging with an opt-out. Annex I Part I requires recording and monitoring relevant internal activity, including access to or modification of data and functions, with a user opt-out. On a constrained device that is a small, bounded security event log plus a way to get it off the device. This doubles as the telemetry that makes Article 14 reporting possible.
Data minimisation, availability, secure deletion. Collect only what the purpose needs, keep essential functions working through a denial-of-service attempt, and give users a way to wipe all data and settings permanently.
An SBOM. Part II requires one in a commonly used, machine-readable format, covering at least top-level dependencies. CycloneDX, an Ecma standard (ECMA-424), and SPDX both qualify. Generate it in CI on every release rather than by hand, and include the vendor SDK, RTOS, network stack and bootloader. The same Linux Foundation survey found only 32 per cent of organisations produce SBOMs for all their products.
Vulnerability handling and CVD. A published coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, a contact address for reports, regular security testing, and public advisories once a fix ships. Article 13(5) and (6) add that you must exercise due diligence on third-party components and report vulnerabilities you find in them to their maintainers.
A support period, decided and displayed. Article 13(8) sets the support period at a minimum of five years, unless the product is expected to be in use for less, in which case it matches the expected use time. Article 13(19) requires the end date, at least month and year, to be shown clearly at the time of purchase. Article 13(9) requires each security update to remain available for at least 10 years after issue or for the rest of the support period, whichever is longer. Technical documentation must be kept for at least 10 years or the support period, whichever is longer. A product launched in 2028 therefore commits you to firmware engineering into 2033 and to hosting update files well beyond. That is a line in the business plan, and we covered the wider cost of keeping software alive in The Device Is a Third of the Company.
A risk assessment and technical file. Article 13(2) to (4) require a documented cybersecurity risk assessment that explains which Annex I requirements apply and how you meet them, with a justification for any you consider inapplicable. It goes into the technical documentation alongside the SBOM, test evidence and support period rationale, followed by the EU declaration of conformity and the CE marking.
The RED handover
For radio products the CRA replaces something you are already doing. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/339, adopted on 16 February 2026 and published in the Official Journal on 29 April 2026, repeals the RED cybersecurity delegated act with effect from 11 December 2027. Radio equipment placed on the market up to 10 December 2027 stays under RED Article 3(3)(d), (e) and (f) and the EN 18031 series; from 11 December 2027 the CRA’s Annex I applies. The repeal’s own recitals say Annex I includes all the elements of the RED requirements, so EN 18031 evidence is a head start, not a finished file. Our certification map covers the EN 18031 restrictions and why designing out of them is cheaper than buying a certificate.
What it costs, in euros and dollars
CRA-specific price data is still thin, so treat these as planning ranges. Dollar figures use the ECB reference rate of 1.1216 on 2 November 2026. Notified bodies invoice in euros whether the client is in Amsterdam or Austin, so a US company pays the same amount and carries the currency risk.
The Commission’s 2022 impact assessment is the only primary source with per-product figures. It assumed an average of €18,400 (about $20,600) per product for self-assessment testing and €25,000 (about $28,000) for third-party conformity assessment. It modelled documentation and reporting as an extra 9 per cent of product development cost, against a reference figure of €140,000 per product, and secure development as an extra 30.5 per cent of secure-development cost. Those numbers predate inflation and the current shortage of lab capacity. RED cybersecurity work under EN 18031, the closest live market, has seen notified-body engagements quoted from €60,000 (about $67,000), as our certification map records. For a class I product, plan for €25,000 to €60,000 or more ($28,000 to $67,000 or more) of third-party assessment, on top of the engineering. Article 32(6) requires notified-body fees for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, including start-ups, to be reduced proportionately, though nothing yet says by how much.
For a default-category product the external spend is mainly penetration testing and a review of the technical file; the real cost is internal engineering time. SBOM generation and vulnerability tracking can run on free open-source tooling such as CycloneDX generators and OWASP Dependency-Track. Commercial firmware analysis platforms do not publish prices, so get quotes.
EU founders have one subsidy route American ones generally do not. The SECURE project, funded under the Digital Europe Programme, opened its second call on 1 October 2026, closing 11 December 2026, with up to €30,000 per SME at 50 per cent co-financing. It requires an SME incorporated in the EU or EEA, so a US company would need an EU entity to apply.
The cost that never shows up in a quote is the support period: five years of security maintenance on firmware, app and backend, priced into unit economics before you set a retail price.
If you already build to NIST IR 8259, the Cyber Trust Mark or ETSI EN 303 645
US teams are rarely starting from zero. NIST’s IoT capability catalogue, which refines the IR 8259A and 8259B baselines, lists device identification, device configuration, data protection, logical access to interfaces, software update, cybersecurity state awareness and device security, plus non-technical capabilities for documentation, receiving queries, disseminating information, and education. The FCC’s voluntary U.S. Cyber Trust Mark, adopted in March 2024 with criteria based on NIST IR 8425, requires a public registry entry covering default password change, software update information, the minimum support period and SBOM disclosure. The FCC named the ioXt Alliance its lead administrator on 13 April 2026. European and UK teams usually start from ETSI EN 303 645 and its thirteen provisions.
| CRA requirement | NIST IR 8259 / 8425 | ETSI EN 303 645 | Gap to close for the CRA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secure by default, unique credentials | Device configuration, logical access | 5.1 No universal default passwords | Factory reset to secure state; justify in risk assessment |
| Security updates, automatic by default | Software update | 5.3 Keep software updated | Auto-update default with opt-out and postpone; separate security releases |
| Confidentiality and integrity | Data protection, device security | 5.4, 5.5, 5.7 | State-of-the-art crypto evidence in the technical file |
| Logging and monitoring | Cybersecurity state awareness | 5.10 Examine telemetry | User opt-out; feed into Article 14 triage |
| Vulnerability handling, CVD, contact | Information and query reception | 5.2 Manage vulnerability reports | Public advisories after fixes; component due diligence |
| SBOM | Cyber Trust Mark registry disclosure | Not required | Machine-readable SBOM per release |
| Support period | Cyber Trust Mark minimum support period | 5.3 defined support period | Minimum five years; end date at point of sale; updates kept 10 years |
| Regulatory reporting | None | None | 24h, 72h and final reports via ENISA’s platform |
| Conformity and CE marking | Voluntary label | Voluntary or via EN 18031 | Risk assessment, technical file, EU declaration of conformity, CE |
The pattern is consistent. The product-property work transfers almost entirely. The legal machinery does not: no US or voluntary scheme gives you a technical file, a regulator reporting duty or a CE marking, and the UK’s PSTI regime, with penalties up to £10 million or 4 per cent of revenue, covers only three of the CRA’s requirements.
The checklist
| Obligation | Applies from | What to build | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Determine scope and class (Arts 2, 7, 8; Reg. 2025/2392) | Now | Written classification per product and app/backend, with the core-functionality reasoning | Founder or product lead |
| Register on ENISA’s reporting platform | 11 Sep 2026 | Primary and secondary representatives, EU Login with MFA, CSIRT identified | Security owner |
| Report exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents (Art. 14) | 11 Sep 2026, installed base included | Monitored inbox, triage runbook, 24h, 72h and final report templates, user notice template | Security owner, with CEO sign-off |
| Notified body booked, if class I without a cited standard, or class II | Before DVT for a late-2027 launch | Shortlist, quote, timeline aligned to the build schedule | Regulatory or QA lead |
| Risk assessment (Art. 13(2) to (4)) | 11 Dec 2027 | Threat model per product, mapped to each Annex I point, with justifications | Security owner with firmware lead |
| Secure by default and reset (Annex I Part I) | 11 Dec 2027 | Forced credential setup, no shared defaults, factory reset to secure state | Firmware and app leads |
| Secure update mechanism (Annex I Parts I and II) | 11 Dec 2027 | Signed images, verified boot, rollback protection, fail-safe update, auto-update default, security-only releases | Firmware lead and backend lead |
| Access control, crypto, attack surface | 11 Dec 2027 | Authenticated interfaces, encryption at rest and in transit, locked debug ports | Firmware and hardware leads |
| Logging and secure deletion | 11 Dec 2027 | Bounded security log with opt-out, user wipe function | Firmware lead |
| SBOM (Annex I Part II(1)) | 11 Dec 2027, but needed now for triage | CycloneDX or SPDX generated in CI per release, vendor SDKs included | Build or DevOps owner |
| CVD policy and contact (Annex I Part II; Art. 13(17)) | 11 Dec 2027 | Published policy, single point of contact, advisory process | Security owner |
| Support period (Art. 13(8), (9), (19)) | 11 Dec 2027 | Declared period of five years or more, end date on packaging or listing, 10-year update archive | Founder and finance |
| Technical documentation, DoC, CE (Arts 13(12), 28, 31) | 11 Dec 2027 | Technical file, EU declaration of conformity, kept 10 years or the support period | Regulatory or QA lead |
| EU importer or authorised representative (Arts 18, 19) | Before first EU sale | Mandate, contact details on product or packaging, document pack for the importer | Founder (US companies especially) |
The order to do it in
Classify first, because a class I answer changes your calendar more than anything else on the list. Register on the reporting platform and write the triage runbook next: it is the obligation that already applies, it costs almost nothing, and it is embarrassing to be caught without. Then put the SBOM into CI, since you cannot answer “are we affected?” during an incident without it. Decide the support period while the business model is still on a whiteboard, not after the packaging is printed. Build the update path and secure defaults into the firmware architecture before EVT, because retrofitting signed boot into a shipping product means a hardware revision. Book the notified body, if you need one, during DVT.
None of this is exotic. It is the security work a careful team would do anyway, written down in a form a regulator can audit. At RMBG the CRA items sit in the same requirements document as battery life and RF performance, for the reason we gave in The Hard Part Moved: early on, all of it is cheap.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), consolidated text by article — Springlex, from OJ L 2024/2847, 20.11.2024
- CRA Article 14: reporting obligations of manufacturers — Springlex
- CRA Article 13: obligations of manufacturers — Springlex
- CRA Article 32: conformity assessment procedures — Springlex
- CRA Article 64: penalties — Springlex
- CRA Article 69: transitional provisions — Springlex
- CRA Annex I: essential cybersecurity requirements — Springlex
- CRA Annex III: important products — Springlex
- CRA Annex IV: critical products — Springlex
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392, Annex: technical description of product categories — Springlex
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392 of 28 November 2025 — TÜV Rheinland
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/339 repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30, OJ L 29.4.2026 (PDF) — IBF Solutions
- The CRA Single Reporting Platform is launched — ENISA, 11 September 2026
- Single Reporting Platform: Frequently Asked Questions — ENISA
- Commission CRA application guidance published, 27 July 2026 — cyberresilienceact.eu
- Current status of standardisation for the Cyber Resilience Act — IBF Solutions
- CRA standardisation deadlines pushed back two months — cyberresilienceact.eu
- Impact Assessment Report accompanying the CRA proposal, SWD(2022) 282, Annexes — European Commission via Austrian Parliament (PDF)
- Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, SWD(2022) 283 — European Commission via Austrian Parliament (PDF)
- 2026 CRA Awareness and Readiness Report, June 2026 — The Linux Foundation (PDF)
- SECURE second open call for CRA SME funding, 1 October 2026 — cyberresilienceact.eu
- Euro foreign exchange reference rates, 2 November 2026 — European Central Bank (PDF)
- OWASP CycloneDX (ECMA-424) — OWASP Foundation
- NIST IoT Device Cybersecurity Requirement Catalogs — NIST
- FCC IoT labeling program — Pillsbury, March 2024
- Public Notice DA 26-354: ioXt Alliance selected as Lead Administrator of the U.S. Cyber Trust Mark Program — FCC, 13 April 2026
- ETSI EN 303 645 categories and provisions — jtsec (PDF)
- New UK law bans default passwords on smart devices — The Hacker News, April 2024